Revisiting the Security Maxims

From "Security Maxims" by Roger G. Johnston
http://www.ne.anl.gov/capabilities/vat/seals/maxims.html

Always material to mine here by comparing these broad general statements to my work in physical security and so I started reading through them again and found this:

Low-Tech Maxim: Low-tech attacks work (even against high-tech devices and systems).
Comment: So don’t get too worked up about high-tech attacks.


Indeed they do. You can put a high security deadbolt with a high security key on a door and if the bad guy can kick the whole door in or pry it open with a big screwdriver, they are just as 'in' as if they had the key. Seen it.

This also applies to picking attacks on houses. It seems there are few since most houses here in Canada can be breached with a big boot. Why invest in subtle when blunt is faster and more reliable? The criminal implications are the same either way.

Oh, here is a different example. I was doing work in a mall kiosk and one of the staff complained his Audi was broken into so they could get at his iPod and its charging cable. Really? He left them visible? No, he had them in the glove box and only the male end of the cable could be seen. They broke a window and it cost him more for the window than the iPod. Remember folks, all car windows break about the same.


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Laux Myth ... Thoughts From a Locksmith
By MartinB, Found @ http://lauxmyth.blogspot.com/