Fire Exit Cliche

Another deadbolt over an exit device on the back of a banquet room.   (Another pair along the same wall had two vertical rod devices LBR with no deadbolts. However, they did not latch!)

This is almost cliche it is so common. So I should point out something 'unique' here.  They did not seem to attend to finish. The brass plates are tarnished but the exit could  have been in brass and it would eventually look about the same. Well, the grey looks bad and cheap. However, it would be fire rated.  I did not open the doors to see if that opening is fire rated but I have to assume it is since I know they exit into a supply hall as they do not exit to outside and this room could seat over 100 for a meal.

I know some will see the naked LCN 4041 and gasp too. While ugly that is hardly a fire exit problem.  If you look on the left, you can see the alcove for the matching pair of this double egress set. 

And this is a detail of the door in the alcove.  It too has a deadbolt over the exit but that is out of frame on this shot. What you are seeing is a knob prep with the back of the exit device head visible. I am assuming the sex nuts are used to hold the device on this metal door. If I am right, this door was fire rated, leaving the hole is both ugly and a compliance issue.  I would welcome thought on whether a fire label would still be valid had the modification included a riveted plate to seal that hole.  Done in brass, it could 'hide' much better.

I have chosen to not comment on the security of this arrangement but that could be a whole different blog posting.


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The contents of this post are released for non-profit or educational use in whole or in part provided this statement and the attribution below are kept attached. And remember, keep your follower on the plug.

Laux Myth ... Thoughts From a Locksmith
By MartinB, Found @ http://lauxmyth.blogspot.com/

Diving Deep Into Pi

There are many creative ways to generate key, safe and alarm codes.  Some are trivial and generate repetitive or patterned codes.  I am going to cover a few of these to avoid followed by a few to get you stronger codes.

Birthdays & Other Dates
During setting safe codes, you learn from the client the code you just set the safe to was derivative of some birth date or other anniversary. In one case, the safe code was always pulled from one date or other.  The problem is this generates a very small set of safe codes.  A past employee who knows the last code was derivative of a date, can guess the new code is too. (If you tell me, then you probably tell some of the staff too.) Another problem is this code is drawn from a small set since it will over choose numbers under 12, under 30 and even the year is not truly random.

Phone Numbers
See everything I said above. I should add that if you were to derive a code from two different phone numbers of people who most of the staff do not know AND never tell anybody you were pulling the code from phone numbers, you could do this sometimes.  If you repeat it often, you will fall into patterns regardless.  A fact of life, we run out of friends at times.

Address Numbers
See everything I said above.

Time for some better methods.

Internet Random Number Generators
Many of these give pseudorandom numbers in that they repeat -- eventually. Some give truly random numbers by sampling real world noise.  Either way, to make this work for you, get the web page to print a few hundred at a time. When you need the alarm or safe code, you can pick six digits from the page and you could read down or at some angle too.

This link will give you 1000 numbers between one and 999 999 into ten columns. (It does not pad zeros to the front of shorter numbers so 15346 is 015346.  To a minor degree, you are decreasing the randomness to add the zero at the end.)

https://www.random.org/integers/?num=1000&min=1&max=999999&col=10&base=10&format=html&rnd=new

Let's assume you are the head cashier and you told even one staff this was your method to get safe codes. Or somebody may have snooped at the computer, the printer or the connection. You want the code you finally use to be well hidden.  Part of this is pulling 1000 codes from the server but you could also pull 5000 codes and print all of them too.  Any reload of the page will do no good as it will give a different set of codes.  However, the computer and printer may cache the pages you are using.  Again, print a page or two and then pick one code.

Diving Into Pi
Modern mathematics gives up several decimal numbers which never repeat nor terminate.  One such number is the number Pi from geometry as the ratio of a circle circumference to diameter. It is now calculated to billions of digit but you only need find a web pages with a few million digits and dive down.  Like the random numbers above, you can get a printer to spit out pages and pages of digits.  You print and then pick the six digits you need either by standard reading or backwards or vertically or some other sampling.

Again, if you are a had cashier, save these pages in a secure place.  Provided you did not circle the code you used nobody could find the code from them.  However, a week later you could since you picked the sample the first time.

To get you started, here is a link to get the first million digits of Pi.
http://newton.ex.ac.uk/research/qsystems/collabs/pi/
There are many other similar sites on the web.

There are also similar numbers to use in much the same way.
Square root of 2 or the roots of many other numbers.
Looking on the web, I found this great link page from NASA.  It gives several numbers to many decimal digits.
http://apod.nasa.gov/htmltest/rjn_dig.html

Something Approximating a Summary
One can use simple methods and faithfully do two things to get secured codes.  Mix up your methods and do not tell anybody how you derived a code.

The better system is to use a method which does not matter if they know.  Find a source for thousands of random codes and pick one. Next time around, you generate a few thousand more. I could learn your method and you still not 'guess' the code.

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The contents of this post are released for non-profit or educational use in whole or in part provided this statement and the attribution below are kept attached. And remember, keep your follower on the plug.

Laux Myth ... Thoughts From a Locksmith
By MartinB, Found @ http://lauxmyth.blogspot.com/ 

Master Key Exceptions

I have been building master key systems lately and mostly they have been simple tree structures.  There are times when you should vary from this. Some are statutory and some simply more practical. (I am not going to cite laws of my province or nation, since the net is bigger than that.  Get to know your local laws.)

A room or group of rooms should be outside the basic master key system if any of the following apply.

1. Cash storage or high value inventory.  If you ask staff to sign for the contents of a room or safe or till drawer, then you should isolate key access very strongly. If many staff travel about casually with keys, then cash or product shortages can not be traced.

2. Explosives. Lets keep these in the hands of only the licensed people.

3. Drugs. You may need to distinguish between OTC, prescription and narcotic type drugs. These are often treated differently in the laws which govern who has control for these.  Often the drug storage in a hostipal ward is under the control of only one pharmacist or a senior nurse.  Some drugs have street value and then during the day issues of armed robbery need be addressed and at night issues of forced entry need be addressed.

4. Forensic evidence. Police agencies collect objects which may have to later be used in court. However, accounting firms and others gather information which they may later pass to the police to generate charges.  For this to be useable in court, you need to show you have had continuous custody of the artifacts.  If not, the police can not lever your information into a search warrant and certainly not as evidence in court. Hence, private investigators need to have control of the keys to rooms holding records and artifacts.

5. Radioactive material. Workplace safety issues requires you keep untrained staff safely away from radiation.  Additionally, there are often federal regualation.

6. Personnel records. Employment records are best isolated from general access. Since you often have a janitor with a partial masterkey, this room will often get cleaned during the days. (Now that I get to it, many of the rooms above get cleaned during the day and often by the staff responsible and not the general janitorial staff.)

7. Accounting records in a server room. Your financial files are expected to be secured at the same level as paper records. The server room needs keying restricting it to only those who need access. (Regulations which derive from the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 in the USA may affect you and it is your responsibility to know it.)

8. Fire arms and munitions. Much like explosives and radioactive material, if you have these to store in a room, you know you have regulations governing their storage.

There are several ways to key rooms outside the master key system.  The worst is to simply pick a random key and pin the cylinder to that. Now you have to keep that as a record should you need to cut more keys. Often these rooms have very small sets of people with keys even having only ONE key in circulation which passes at shift change to the person on duty. If you pick a random key, you have to manually read through the pages of key records to assure there is no cross-over with any other room.

The better way is to plan for a small number of rooms to have master key exceptions and block them. All the keys are close together and the relationship to other key groups is clear.

These exceptions can be done in one of two ways.  The first is to have the key below the Top Master Key (TMK) with no intermediate master keys at all.  In a crisis, only the most senior staff can get access to the room. This might be how personnel records are kept. The other way is to set the lock as Single Key Different (SKD) with no master keys functioning at all. This is possibly better for drug and narcotic storage.

No list like this could be complete and the keys have to react to how the organization is structured. If you think I should add more categories, feel free to toss me a line.


And remember, keep your follower on the plug.

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The contents of this post are released for non-profit or educational use in whole or in part provided this statement and the attribution below are kept attached.

Laux Myth ... Thoughts From a Locksmith
By MartinB, Found @ http://lauxmyth.blogspot.com/

Unknown Assumptions Can Bite

We all make assumptions as we work and we assume those we work with are using the same one we have.  Face to face, you can verbally check on such things. However, when you have hardware to install, the only way I can know what assumptions the manufacturer is using, is if they are given with the directions. 

Allow me to go back a few years.  I was sent to a series of retail stored to add a simple block to modify the electric strike.  The strike allowed the latch to pass out the back so either door could close first.  The day started with 20 of these strange geometric aluminum blocks and a page of addresses.  Upon arrival at the first site, I found one dimension of the block was too big and it had to be cut and ground down.  I did it and thought this will take a while.  I did three that day all the same.  My times were getting better but not great. 

This is not the model under discussion, but it shows the open back of the electric strike.

The next morning, we made contact with the head office which had sent these out. They were concerned I had only done 3 on the first day.  However, I was sent to do more.  My second stop on the second day, I had a front door which was 2 1/4 inch (57 mm) built from the standard 1 3/4 inch (44mm) door with a plastic and aluminum liner of 1/2 inch (13 mm).  The part fit perfectly.  You put in two screws and done. 

It was then that I phoned the supplier.  Several things had gotten lost in the communication and to this day I know not where.  They had designed this for the thickened door and believe almost all of the sites had the same door. They also expected me to just report the actual door thickness if wrong so they could send out the different version of the blocks in the right quantity.  All fair enough but none of that got to me -- the only guy seeing the doors in my city.

Brings me back to a more recent install. I am going to be vague since this job is still ongoing.  Perhaps in a year or two I can say more.  I am a journeyman and yet was installing some door hardware I had not done before.  I read the directions and thought I had this under control.  Also, this is fire rated hardware so compliance depends on doing just that. When done, it did not work as required. I pulled it off and modified the instructions to get the function back.  The manufacturer had based the instructions on certain assumptions about the door construction which in hindsight are not required to be true even for fire doors. 

I have installed hardware of many type and usually such assumptions are clearly stated so that if some condition is not met, you change how you proceed.  For instance, if a hollow metal door needs a closer and you suddenly find it is the thinnest possible metal without any support behind, you can run sex nuts through the door.  However, all the big names in closers will state that they assume the door has support for the device.

I guess in summary, I just want people to be clear about the condition under which a piece of hardware can be used and can not. It saves the guy on the ground time.  And finally, if hardware is hard to install and there are choices in suppliers, easy of installation and repair is part of the decision making criteria. OK, so it is not the final say but I can live with that. 


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The contents of this post are released for non-profit or educational use in whole or in part provided this statement and the attribution below are kept attached.

Laux Myth ... Thoughts From a Locksmith
By MartinB, Found @ http://lauxmyth.blogspot.com/ 

Driving While Dangerous

Here in Alberta, there is a new law prohibiting the use of cellular phones while you drive.  It took the province long enough.  It seemed it needed some research.  I had been doing the research for years by observation of myself and others.  I found that when I tried to talk on a cell and drive, I made driving errors.  I had mostly stopped answering while I drove and now with the new employer I am directed not to answer.  Just as well.

I have to be clear, it is not just my errors I could notice.  I would see a vehicle drift over a lane line or just sway within its lane. Other times, you could see the vehicle slow down or fully change a lane without signalling.  Upon getting beside the vehicle, I could see the driver talking or even worse texting.  However, when I am beside a vehicle which I saw failed to stay in its lane, I felt in peril.  If the driver left the lane once it could again.

So I have started to honk my horn as I pass such vehicles thinking if I saw a lack of lane control a few times and now I am about to pass, I must be careful the driver does not move into me.  I honk a series of steady short blasts.  It is designed to 'wake' the driver up and get me more mental attention.

To the guy in the white SUV on Thursday morning on the Yellowhead Trail westbound at about 156 Street, that is why I was honking.  You looked both confused and angry and yet you did not hang up. I will honk again in passing you if I see you breach the lane lines twice before I pass your vehicle.  To the person to whom he was speaking, you bear some responsibility too.  If you hear a series of short horn honk, hang up and call again later.  Is any call worth that much??


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The contents of this post are released for non-profit or educational use in whole or in part provided this statement and the attribution below are kept attached.

Laux Myth ... Thoughts From a Locksmith
By MartinB, Found @ http://lauxmyth.blogspot.com/ 

Compromised Fire Exits on Restaurant

Update on Sunday 28 November 2011:
I revisited this restaurant and saw two significant changes.  The sign over the large refrigerator which had been taped over was removed. A new sign was added above the patio door with the MS bolt over the exit device. The maximum distance from an exit is visually about the same. You decide if it works better now. I have no way of knowing if the MS bolt is locked or not.  The patio gates are still padlocked.  I can only guess the fire department did visit.

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Update on Thursday 20 October 2011:
Occupational Health and Safety replied and tells me at times the health inspectors will forward concerns.  Good to hear. Nothing in the rest of the email suggests he read this blog post or even the original letter.  (It was clear this was forwarded to him internally and it may be others chose to clip it and remove the context needed for a better reply. Granted, the same could have happened for the other two respondents.)

My next adventure is to go back to this restaurant.  I wonder if somebody has found the place by photo alone. That is entirely plausible.

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Update on Thursday 13 October 2011:
I wrote an email to our health inspectors and copied same to local fire department and occupational health and safety. The central questions was, "Are the Capital Health Inspectors required to notify the Fire Inspectors when an exit has clearly been degraded? OR may they officially do so?"  I quickly was sent a reply from the food inspectors and it was more a non-reply.  They told me the fire department does that inspection.  Left me wondering how detailed they had read my note. In the end, they are using their inspection in the narrowest sense and do not pass anything along to the fire department even if obvious and perilous. It was a short and mostly sad letter. (The health department had not copied the fire department their note to me for some reason.)

The fire department copy was forwarded internally and I was phoned.  I called the contact back and spoke quite freely. Inspections are routine or requested by the public. This speaker tells me they do get referrals from some health inspectors.  He also explained the form for the public to trigger an inspection I had seen on the web site is treated confidentially.  (You have to be known to them but they do not release your name to the site under inspection.  A fully reasonable policy.)

Still, I would like it that a more official channel was there.  A health inspector could just follow the letter of the law and see the cooler is cool enough and the heaters are hot enough.  Customer safety ends with the food equipment and handling. It is only protection of the public in that narrow sense.  Oh well, guess that is how it is.

No word back from OHS but did get a ticket number saying somebody will read it.  Fair enough at this time.

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After telling others of this on Twitter, I finally visited a favourite eatery and got the pictures I promised. I have to admit that I have eaten here for a year or two and only noticed how bad the exits were more recently. Since it is Saturday, I can not find if the health inspector are required to flag such problems to the fire department inspectors who are the AHJ. I sent off an email and will update this posting as information arrives. (Deep in my memory, I am sure I have seen uniformed fire fighters eating here.  I am guessing they did not notice and yet this is all in the public spaces of the operation.)

I am going to start at the front door which has simple push/pull handles under a deadbolt. Well, a double cylinder deadbolt. The door is signed an emergency exit so only constitutes a risk to staff before and after the customers are present. We have all heard it, "We will only lock it when nobody is inside." I did not get a usable photo of this door.

Within the seating area, there is a glass door opening onto a patio.  This door is NOT signed an exit but is highly visible with its panic exit device under an MS deadbolt.  I could not confirm if the deadbolt was locked or not but reasonable to assume locked since it was cool enough the patio was not in use. (There is a sign slightly above this door and it points the way right toward the last photo in this series.)  I could not find a web connection for the sticker on the door so suspect it is a 'dummy' tag.

First, I would like to take a detour to the patio.  People exiting here will be on a fenced patio with one gate with another exit device. Although this is a terrible photo, there is a padlock holding the gate at knee level.  In the event of a fire, a chair would solve the problem on any of the glass panels.  (The padlock is lined up with the curb behind and so is not very visible here.  Strangely, a second padlock was sitting on a rail nearby with no apparent function at all.)

 

Finally, there is this door.  It is where the overhead sign mentioned about points and it too has an EXIT sign which looks like it has had the bulbs removed and red tape used to cover the word.  The door itself enters one end of the kitchen along an exterior wall.  I can only guess the sign was altered at the same time the big fridge was placed over the door.  Since you can see over the pass thru, you can tell the basic plan of the front of the kitchen and people could still exit via another door and walk past the grills and fryers. However, that door is NOT marked an exit for exactly that reason.

I could not evaluate the final exit from the back of the kitchen but the outside hardware did not make me optimistic either.

So if I may, let me post a completely plausible scenario.  Before opening when only one manager with a key is present, staff overheat a fryer and create an oil fire. This blocks the secondary exit, the patio is not an option and the primary needs a key to open from inside.

I have not named this location since I know problems like this are all too common and solving this case is not solving the problem.

 I was once asked during a night club renovation to put barrel bolts at the tops of three out of four exit doors on the front. On behalf of my employer, I explained the problem and declined and the owner was fine with that.  A few days later when my work was done, I saw the owners walking with the fire inspector hours before it was to open.  As I wrote my paperwork and the fire official wrote his on a different table, we were both in clear view of staff from the general contractor putting on the barrel bolts I had declined to install.  The owner got his papers calmly from the inspector and the inspector walked out the only remaining operable door. To make a stink that time, would have cost us a client and probably me my job.  Even now, I can not tell from our local fire department web site if complaints are written in confidentially or my name MUST be release to the business as part of the process.  Of course, I will name places if compelled to do so but why not have more eyes knowing the problem and professionally working to solve it.


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The contents of this post are released for non-profit or educational use in whole or in part provided this statement and the attribution below are kept attached.

Laux Myth ... Thoughts From a Locksmith
By MartinB, Found @ http://lauxmyth.blogspot.com/

Fire Exit vs. Fire Sepation Doors

I just posted a comment elsewhere about a question of fire doors.  I find this topic very frustrating since there is a consistent language ambiguity which confuses the issue and hence the public including building operators.

A fire separtion door is labelled on the door and frame or at least was when installed.  The label includes a time this wall, frame, door and hardware is designed to hold a fire back on the other side. The testing is more complex but imagine a single sheet of paper taped to one side.  A closed latched door should keep the paper from burning even from just heat for that period of time. And to be honest, by the time the paper does burn a person on the other side of the same door is dead from smoke exposure.

Different doors have different separation values.  Where I live, a 20 minute door is needed from a residential living suite in an apartment block going into the hallways.  The staircase doors must be 45 minutes of separation.  There are also walls and doors rated higher.

The other type of door is a fire exit which is about getting the people out of the building and out alive.  Many doors are both but one which is NOT a fire separation door is that from the building to the exterior.  This door may require an exit device for people to exit but the door and hardware is not fire rated for separation.

Back to the language, I try to call these two types of doors by distinct names.   A 'fire door' means a fire exit in some contexts and a fire separation door in others and can be both at the same time.  I would like people to start calling one group as fire separation doors and the other as fire exit doors. Also, when you say it is a separation door, give the time as rated.*  I firmly think this will move building operators and junior contractors to know the difference.  To repeat, stop saying 'fire door'.

Or perhaps I am crazy.  You tell me.


* I once saw a 20 minute door in a 45 minute frame. Given the location, the 45 made more sense but all I could do was suggest the building operator check on this. I know he would not do so even at the time.

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The contents of this post are released for non-profit or educational use in whole or in part provided this statement and the attribution below are kept attached.

Laux Myth ... Thoughts From a Locksmith
By MartinB, Found @ http://lauxmyth.blogspot.com/

Photos and Names ... Please

I was on Twitter the other night and read a posting by a real locksmith who used a 'mug shot' in the profile.   There was a web address too and I just had to follow it.  Not a face to be seen and not a personal name either.  It was 'family owned' but so is every mafia front company.

We all know how this goes.  A company really only exists because of the people within it.  We do the work and the company pays us. Simple really. What sort of company does not name the owners or staff?  Think of it a bit.

One type is where there are so many it is impossible to keep up and where each is so interchangeable with the next it matters little who each person really is.  Or it is just so large it is hard to know where to start.  You know these companies by reputation and you may not get a GREAT product but you know where to find some level of manager.  In this group think of MacDonalds or IBM. Such web sites do not have staff often but have locations and detailed phone numbers. 

Another type of company has no pride in its service and no interest in you as a customer.  You are as replaceable as the crowd at the midway.  Next week its a new city and the carny who never cared before is seeing new suckers now.  In the locksmith trade, these are the call centre operations.  You can not find who they are since they have no interest in that.  You can only see one phone number and it is for booking a job only. 

And I keep hearing questions on how to fight back.  How do you keep shady operations from undercutting you with poorly trained staff doing shoddy work?  Of course they charge less for less.

Locksmith fight back by setting up web pages which show you are in this for the long haul.  You give an address and your names.  You show photos of your people.  You show the training of your staff.  I am a Certified Journeyman Locksmith (CJL) in my province. Spill folks.  If you bought a business licence, toss up a scan of it.  Show the ALOA registration card for the last conference.

And stop letting government off the hook.  If they have regulations for business licenses and criminal record check for locksmiths, ask they get some enforcement. Often they will say they wait for consumer complaints. Easy answer but nothing stops governments from protecting the consumer before many get ripped off.

And lets also be real here.  In the end people do business with people -- even if the money sometimes flows from company to company.  When you answer the phone you say your name.  When you pass out a business card, you say your name.  The call centres can never do this since they are not in your city.

So ... are you going to have your name and photo on your web pages or not?  It's your reputation. It's one more chance to differentiate yourself from the rogue elements.

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The contents of this post are released for non-profit or educational use in whole or in part provided this statement and the attribution below are kept attached.

Laux Myth ... Thoughts From a Locksmith
By MartinB, Found @ http://lauxmyth.blogspot.com/ 

Mapping Computer Security onto Physical Security: Two Factor Authentication

I just heard of the hack of the Twitter account for @nbcnews* from @gcluley in the Naked Security blog.  In the post, he suggests "an additional level of authentication" which is the idea of two factor authentication.  To access the account, you verify two kinds of data at once.  I will not go into how this is done with computers but there are a few ways.  The problem for Twitter -- and the end users -- it is slightly more expensive and not as convenient.  The computer security people and locksmiths know that the average 'joe' will torpedo security measures to get convenience.  In work environments, clear articulation of required protocols will lessen such failures for both the computer and physical security.  Without monitoring, however, you will find it hard to discipline for breaches.  Likewise, if you can not show action on small infractions, a firing for a large infraction is hard to support.

In my world, two factor authentication happens for high value targets.  One example would be some storage room with very controlled inventory such as narcotics, weapons, ammunition, explosives or sensitive documents.   The room is only to be opened when two people are present.  We set it up with two locks and each is keyed differently.  The locks are almost without exception high security types with UL 437 rating.  (In other parts of the world other standards come to play. The idea is very tight control on production of additional keys and the cylinders are very resistant to non-destructive bypass methods.)  Typically, a shop would make two keys only and one is put in service and the second is given to a superior who will often receive it with such a tight grip the blood is not getting into the knuckles around that key. 

In use, one key is signed to one staffer and the other key is assigned to another.  Having seen such rooms, they often have alarms for just this space and you just KNOW the two people each have to enter a different code to turn the alarm off.  Where does this fail?  One mode of failure is when the key is easy to copy and one staffer can get the other key.  Another -- and I have seen this -- is when the operation is short staffed and makes the choice to sign both keys to the same person. Another one would be a corrupt locksmith who supplies more keys than declared. As with any security process, there are certainly other modes of failure including some which may have not even been found yet.

Another common dual custody situation is often done in large retail operations where the cash office signs a deposit off an armoured truck team.  The staff in the cash office will drop the deposit into a chute inside a big safe where the deposit sits unreverable in the lower compartment.  When the truck comes, they know one of the lock combinations for the depository but only the store staff know the other.  In this way, the safe with the most money does not get opened unless both are present.

All for now, but I have been thinking of mapping the issues of computer security faults into the real world of keys and locks for a while now.  Consider this chapter one.

* Since this account has been compromised, it makes little sense to link to it.

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The contents of this post are released for non-profit or educational use in whole or in part provided this statement and the attribution below are kept attached.

Laux Myth ... Thoughts From a Locksmith
By MartinB, Found @ http://lauxmyth.blogspot.com/

The Triangle of Security - Convenience - Cost

The Triangle of Security - Convenience - Cost

In dealing with clients, you often have to remind them that some goals to some degree are in conflict for a project or even just one door.  In a past post, I spoke of how secure a lock is based on 3-T's of Time, Tools, and Training.  For the most difficult safe containers you need all three to even hope to open it.  With doors,  you can make a few concessions in your training or tools but only if you take more time.  It is a balance but eventually when you compromise on all three, you really can not open a locked door with anything more than a 'police pick' -- kick it in.

The work of hardware has a similar triangle. I can get better security from an ordinary door by using a mortice block instead of a cylindrical lockset.  However, it is at higher cost for both the lock and the door. You also get more convenience with the mortice block as more functions are possible and the lock cylinder can be quickly changed out.

Clients want convenience to get into rooms or out.  The out direction is often defined by fire exit codes. When a door has to plausibly serve 100s of people fast, the opening must have exit hardware.  That is more expensive than door knobs and always will be.  For entrances where you need to allow the frail or handicapped, lever sets are needed over knobs, but again those have a higher price point. For the ultimate in easy access, install an auto-operator.  One simply pushes a button and the door opens.  Convenience costs money.

A good example of a secure door with ease of access is an electrified exit device with a high security cylinder in the outside trim. Everybody enters using a RFID fob and PIN number and then the door pulls open.  It is under camera and I am guessing when you scan your fob, the camera image is tossed up beside the photo of the person associated with that fob to some guard desk. It would be consistent with the place. The key was given very limited availability and I am certain would trigger a forced-entry alarm if used as it would be opening the door without an audit trail getting a name. (For doors on access control which have this set up, the alarm system can not tell the authorized key holder is opening the door from somebody just breaking in with a wrecking bar.)

Now I can get you low cost too.  On some back exit from an office block where it goes outside, you can supply grade 2 panics which are not fire rated.  The parts look thin and you know they would pry open easier than the best grade one devices.  There is one model with a terrible way to hold its rim cylinder in the outside trim.  A big screwdriver could rip that cylinder out. Where the best models will hold onto the door with up to 6 bolts, some of these will use 2.  You get the point.  However, the client wants a low price and as long as you explain the limits of the hardware you are providing, it is fine in my books.

Really, the summary of all this boils down to "You can have it all, but not all at once" or 'You get what you pay for".

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The contents of this post are released for non-profit or educational use in whole or in part provided this statement and the attribution below are kept attached.

Laux Myth ... Thoughts From a Locksmith
By MartinB, Found @ http://lauxmyth.blogspot.com/

A Security Audit OF a Locksmith, Round One

Commercial locksmiths love when a bank or some other institution has a security audit since it often gets the shop work.  You get work right after the audit and sometimes in the week just before the next audit.  I also know the auditors find all kinds of accounting and personnel procedures to change as well but that does not get us work.  In all this, I was wondering if anybody with serious security concerns was looking a bit deeper.  With that in mind, I have written a series of questions to audit the locksmith since the security of the end user is partly dependent on the diligence of the locksmith shop.  There are occasional robberies of shops after all.

I am not making any comment on any of the shops I know.  Also, I am trying to strive for best practice at all times.  However, answers need to be realistic in the real world we all work.  I have chosen to toss out the questions first and invite anybody to add others for later revisions.  After the questions, I will give my thoughts on what is best practice for each item.  I fully expect 'not applicable' will be the correct reply for some shops to many of the questions.

Yikes, did I ever open a bucket of worms.  I keep finding questions about areas of vulnerability.  I am tossing these out now hoping I get some ideas of other questions to ask.  I still have a page of question on staffing I have not typed.

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Physical Security

(This set of questions should be answered for each building used by the locksmith where it has multiple locations.)

Does the shop have high security locks on all exterior doors?  Do all exterior doors have deadbolts with 1 inch or 2.5 cm of throw? Are astragals or blockers in place if appropriate? Do cylinders have taper rings to limit extraction? Are all doors code compliant as emergency exits?

Are the exterior door of good enough construction to resist some physical attack?

Would broken glass in the door or sidelight be an effective way to open any door?  Are all such glass surfaces coated in security films?  Does breaking glass trigger an alarm?

Are records kept in an interior locked room also with a high security key?  After hours, would an alarm condition exist before an intruder reaches this room?

Does the alarm system have contacts on all doors and openable windows?  Does it have motions sensors to cover all interior space?  Is the alarm monitored?  Does the alarm have battery and cell phone backup?  Is the cell phone back-up guarded against a fast disable?

Does the shop have interior space monitored by cameras?  Do the cameras have IR ability?  Where does the signal feed?  Backup?  Offsite backup?  How long are the files or video tapes kept?  Are the record secured from tampering?

Are any exterior walls vulnerable to a mining attack from outside or an adjacent building? Are all places directly inside under a motion sensor?  How far could an intruder move before tripping a double hit on the alarm?


Record Keeping

Are files with master and restricted keying records kept locked in a cabinet or safe when the business is closed?  Give the rating of the this cabinet or safe.

During business hours, are they also secured from non-cleared staff? 

Is there any leakage of key codes or other sensitive security information into the accounting stream?

Are ready-to-use keys kept in the files associated with the building they operate? 

Is any kind of encoding used on key records sent with staff outside the building?  Are keys tagged with the function and location?

How long are dormant files kept after the last work done in a location?  Is the building or operation notified of their destruction?

Who owns the keying record of the building and how do you make this clear to the end user who buys a master key system?  Is the end user given a choice??


Staffing
(Whole page of questions pending.)


Procedures

Are old master keys decoded before planning new systems?  Is this done in a way you can reasonably know all the old keys are retired?

Are all keys shipped to the end user with standard codes?  Could they be shipped without code if asked or fully blind codes??

Do you keep off site records off all the key system files you have on record?

What computer systems exist connected to the internet?  If a trojan was ever installed what kinds of data could leak?
___ keying charts  ___ client names ___ financials  __ emails  ___ quotes
___ others, specify __________________________________

Of computers not connected to the internet, are they systematically backed up?  Are the systems checked for viruses from sources like CDs and USB sticks?  Is data stored overnight as encrypted files?  Good encryption??

Are all laptops in use at the site equipped with recovery software?  Do they encrypt key data?  Will it erase if a brute force attack is tried?

Are all passwords strong on all critical systems?  No really … how strong are they?   Are they written on paper but only in a safe?



Get back to me with more good questions you think would help this topic along.

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The contents of this post are released for non-profit or educational use in whole or in part provided this statement and the attribution below are kept attached.

Laux Myth ... Thoughts From a Locksmith
By MartinB, Found @ http://lauxmyth.blogspot.com/

Revisiting the Security Maxims

From "Security Maxims" by Roger G. Johnston
http://www.ne.anl.gov/capabilities/vat/seals/maxims.html

Always material to mine here by comparing these broad general statements to my work in physical security and so I started reading through them again and found this:

Low-Tech Maxim: Low-tech attacks work (even against high-tech devices and systems).
Comment: So don’t get too worked up about high-tech attacks.


Indeed they do. You can put a high security deadbolt with a high security key on a door and if the bad guy can kick the whole door in or pry it open with a big screwdriver, they are just as 'in' as if they had the key. Seen it.

This also applies to picking attacks on houses. It seems there are few since most houses here in Canada can be breached with a big boot. Why invest in subtle when blunt is faster and more reliable? The criminal implications are the same either way.

Oh, here is a different example. I was doing work in a mall kiosk and one of the staff complained his Audi was broken into so they could get at his iPod and its charging cable. Really? He left them visible? No, he had them in the glove box and only the male end of the cable could be seen. They broke a window and it cost him more for the window than the iPod. Remember folks, all car windows break about the same.


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The contents of this post are released for non-profit or educational use in whole or in part provided this statement and the attribution below are kept attached.

Laux Myth ... Thoughts From a Locksmith
By MartinB, Found @ http://lauxmyth.blogspot.com/

Coaching those who dials safes

I was called to a job site to change the combination of a safe lock and found the new operator of this container* did not usually dial safes. It took some time to get him back doing it smoothly. As is often the case, I would rather teach him good dialing technique than have his coworker try to pass on her instructions. (In this case she was the person giving up custody of the contents and it is so much easier if you know the code.) If I do stand around hearing one person try to teach the next, I sometimes want to pull my hair out since they have learned it from some other coworker in some long game of 'telephone'.

Later, that same day I had the chance to reflect on the word coach instead of teach. As a teacher, I know how people react when you tell them you will teach them anything. This is doubly true of adults. You teach people things they do not know when you know it all. Or so the emotional tone of the word works. It may be true but building that defensive wall does not help the communication.

I have taken to describe what I do as coaching. When you coach, you start by saying the person knows some or most of what they need to do and you are there only to improve their skills. Granted, sometimes I am the little league coach and there are 'few' skills there when I start. This can be best as there are no bad habits to clear out. More often, the operator knows everything needed to dial the safe except for one small point. Also, once you say you are coaching you can explain why you are getting in a bit close to see the dial as they spin. I challenge you to try this and see how people react to 'coaching' and yet the rest of what you have to say is all the same.



* I find it funny that safe techs will use just the word container for any kind of locked box at all. It can be 50 lbs or 20 kg of steel with a 'modest' lock. However, it could also be 6000 lbs or 2400 kg of steel, concrete and other stuff with multiple high end locks. Either way it is just a container.


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The contents of this post are released for non-profit or educational use in whole or in part provided this statement and the attribution below are kept attached.

Laux Myth ... Thoughts From a Locksmith
By MartinB, Found @ http://lauxmyth.blogspot.com/

The Hard Disc Drive in the Photocopier

This is a BIG heads up for any company which leases a digital copier and for anybody who has used one. Which is all of us!

Found at Flixxy was this news story from CBS News
Look at http://www.flixxy.com/copy-machines-security-risk.htm
or
The Danger of Digital Copiers - Who Knew?
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-31727_162-20002830-10391695.html?tag=mncol;lst;2
(The CBS viewer did not play well for me but you may have better luck.)

It reports that most digital copiers since 2002 have built in hard drives which store EVERY page copied onto a hard drive. They bought 4 used copiers and found much sensitive information. Who knew they kept all that? Seems many in the trade did but all point to somebody else have told the end user. One company offers an add-on package to clear the hard drive at a stiff price.

I am wondering why this drive can not be cleared from the top end display any time the user wants to do so for free. Sheesh! Meanwhile, all kinds of personal information about you can be leaked all over the place.

What to do?
1. Careful what you copy at a rental location. Anything personal stays there.

2. Dispose of any copier instead of passing back to the lease company. (Or get them to pull the drive from it before you sign it back.)

[Note on publication date. I was trying to edit the posting date of some other post and this was 'moved'. The program does not seem to tell me when it was first posted so I put it at the end of 2010. Seemed easiest.]

Can you have a double-sided deadbolt on your house?

I really have to start this answer by saying I am writing for where I live and work. Laws differ in other places but the reasoning for some of this shines through regardless of where you live. Also, in this context your house is where you live and own. Sometimes law distinguishes between owning the house and simply renting it.

First, the law. You can not put a double deadbolt* on a fire exit since people must have an easy path out during an emergency. In Canada, this mean a functioning adult or child above sixish can get out of a room or a building without special tools or knowledge. A key is considered a special tool. Also, after the building reaches a certain size and/or expected occupancy, it must have two or more exits.

Second, more law. If you own your home, you can legally do stupid things.

Finally, the practical. If unblocked exits are good in public places in lowering the number of deaths in fires and other emergencies, then exits are also good in a house. Consider other options before you install a double deadbolt such as a metal grill over a window in the door or installing the deadbolt below the handle so an arm thru the broken window could never reach the inside anyways.

However, you MIGHT consider a double deadbolt in some narrow situations. I ask my customers where everybody sleeps and to think of what is the primary exit if a fire happens at night. You would NEVER put a double dead bolt on this door. You may also want to skip a secondary door. However, I have seen houses with a third and fourth door onto a deck or into the garage. (You would not normally exit in a panic via a garage but that really depends on your particular floor plan.)

If you think sealing a door against a broken window attack with a double deadbolt is worth the risk, then you should also be adding a glass break sensor to that window so your alarm response is instant if it gets broken. Another good idea is to hang a key close to the door so if this door must become the tertiary** exit, then it can be opened quickly. The practical viability of doing this depends on the physical and mental condition of the most vulnerable person living in the house.

Some of the NEVER even consider it situations would include:
• Granny uses a walker
• Toddlers live in the house
• Only one door
• It is a solid door
• The key will be stored in the inside cylinder
• No key will be placed permanently near it

As you can tell, I actively discourage such deadbolts. In fact, most of the time it is a matter of telling the client it can not be done due to codes and our client base will find other solutions. I hope you do too unless it truly meets a critical security need. After all, if fire exits are a good idea in other places, you family and friends deserve them also.


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*This kind of deadbolt is most formally called a double cylinder deadbolt but it is also called a double sided deadbolt or simply a double deadbolt. Regardless of how you say it, the lock is operated by a key from the outside and also by key from the inside. Only a key holder can open the door.

** It means third.

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The contents of this post are released for non-profit or educational use in whole or in part provided this statement and the attribution below are kept attached.

Laux Myth ... Thoughts From a Locksmith
By MartinB, Found @ http://lauxmyth.blogspot.com/

Washroom Fire Code Violation

I was out for coffee last night at a very large chain. If you live in Canada -- or even if you do not -- you may know it. You can roll-up the rim to win. On the washroom was a simple double sided deadbolt. You know the kind. It makes a prison cell in waiting.

Now as a matter of practice, we are not to 'interpret' fire codes but one line which is a guiding principle run something like the following. A capable person can exit from the room or building without special tools or knowledge. Not much interpretation needed to know a double deadbolt fails this completely. And yet, the hardware exists to do this right. Just off the top of my head are two models which allow a thumbturn inside to only unlock the door so that nobody can lock the multiperson bathroom upon entry. (Large buildings end up with problems like graffiti, drug deals or sex in washrooms if you allow the door to be lockable.) I know the hardware I am thinking is more expensive than the residential mess which was in use but a simple rope would be cheaper than a proper seatbelt. You get my point. They have the cash to use flat-screen TVs to advertise menu items, they can afford good hardware too.

However, this raises another issue. We were encouraged by a member of our local fire department to report violations when we see them and they would investigate. Usually, this mean shooting yourself in your foot since it is your own customer where you find the violation. Should I report this problem? I could get hate from many another locksmith and countless in-house fixers. I would like to hear from you on this.

Why do they keep breaking my car windows?

Asked by retail staff as I was working for his store. "Why do they keep breaking my car windows?"

It is an upscale Audi import with an alarm. It is parked in the back lot of an apartment block. They got some stuff out of it the first time. All he leaves in it now is the charging cable for the iPod.

Well frankly, they got something once. And frankly, the cable hints at something being in the glove box or under the seat. (I never asked but if it has darkly tinted windows, they need to break them to see if there is more to take this time.) In big apartment complexes, nobody even hears car alarms most of the time -- people go numb from the frequent false alarms.

It is a shame, but this guy needs to invest money in a house with a garage to get the car out of site. However, I suspect he spare cash is sunk into keeping windows in his car.

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The contents of this post are released for non-profit or educational use in whole or in part provided this statement and the attribution below are kept attached.

Laux Myth ... Thoughts From a Locksmith
By MartinB, Found @ http://lauxmyth.blogspot.com/

Dilution of Emergency Lights

Driving is a major part of my job and I believe I take it very seriously. However, I have noticed a strange trend. Flashing, blinking and strobing lights everywhere.

A garbage truck driving down a highway does not need a strobing yellow light at the back center. A lawn mowing contractor truck which was parked beyond the sidewalk on the turf does not need flashing orange lights either. A transit bus does not need its brake lights to flash three times each time the brakes are applied. Quite frankly with its big back end it looks like a fire truck from a distance.

How many flashing lights do we need to give us warning and when does diminishing return kick in? I fear drivers are getting immune to some of the flashing warning lights.


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The contents of this post are released for non-profit or educational use in whole or in part provided this statement and the attribution below are kept attached.

Laux Myth ... Thoughts From a Locksmith
By MartinB, Found @ http://lauxmyth.blogspot.com/

Matt Blaze, Computer Scientist takes on locks

For those in the safe community, the name Matt Blaze may not be front and centre but he does have credentials in information security. He turned his computer attention of safe locks a while back and wrote a paper I found most interesting.

Matt Blaze @ crypto.com

Buried in this page are two papers of interest to lock and safe technicians.
One is on safecracking or what we call a manipulation. Another is about masterkeying mechanical locks. For one, he documents the Informed Oracle Attack to escalate authority. (Please use text search in his page to find the papers links directly. If I link to the papers directly, they will download as PDF files instantly.)

His work is not really news in so many ways but it does represent presenting it to a wider audience. How many? Well, the papers were published in 2004. When I first found them, I looked to see if a course was offered in computer security at various colleges and universities. LOTS OF EM. It is reasonable to think these papers have floated past tens of thousands or more of undergraduate students. We are not talking semi-literate and semi-numerate prison convicts. I am talking people who can make sense of the content and for a few hundred dollars find a group two lock to play with and see it works. Once more, security by obscurity fails.


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The contents of this post are released for non-profit or educational use in whole or in part provided this statement and the attribution below are kept attached.

Laux Myth ... Thoughts From a Locksmith
By MartinB, Found @ http://lauxmyth.blogspot.com/

A Subtle "Hello" to the LPO

I had the occasion to shop for new boot laces tonight at a store I both frequent as a shopper and do work as a contractor. As often happens, I am directed to do work in many stores by a Loss Prevention Officer (LPO) and know many of them across the city. However, this time I was there as a shopper and seeing the LPO, I just nodded a hello. In the trade, he or she has to talk first as they may want to be 'undercover' at the moment.

A nod is as good was a wink.

Oh yes, the boot laces. I had to use my angle grinder in a restaurant while it was open. One of cuts needed was vertical and I could not fire the spark stream UP into the air and all over the place. I shot it down and I guess some of it ... or enough of it ... hit my boot and burned partly through the shoe lace. Today the lace broke.